The 2 nd International Conference of the HK RussiaEurasia Research Project, Hanyang Univ., Korea order to reinvigorate Soviet society. In some republics the new scope for political initiative from below was used by local politicians to press for more republican power. Soon also activists outside the party made use of ethnicity as a means to mobilize the population against the communist system. In a country like Poland the communist regime had been challenged by a massive popular movement organized as a labor union, the Solidarność, with strong backing from the national church, Polish Catholicism. In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, the labor unions were completely docile and could not play any similar role as a vessel for opposition, and the church had no tradition of independent action. In this country, the only potential collective identity that could be activated for political purposes was ethnicity.
Unlike religion, ethnicity had not been suppressed in the Soviet Union, on the contrary it had been pervasively institutionalized, on two levels: Individually, as all Soviet citizens carried with them at all times their internal passport in which their personal, ascriptive ethnicity or 'nationality' was marked in the so-called 5 th point; and on the collective level, as the entire state was organized as a gigantic federation of ethnically defined republics (Suny 1993; Slezkine 1994) . Now these two levels were politicized simultaneously and combined in a highly combustive mix: the new political entrepreneurs demanded independence for their republics with an ethnic justification: Ukraine was cast as the homeland of Ukrainians, Latvia as the homeland of Latvians, and so on. The correspondence between the republican structure and the ethnic map of the Soviet Union, however, was, as we all know, far from perfect. Not only millions of ethnic Russians, but also multitudes of other Soviet citizens lived outside their putative 'homelands'. In the new ethnicized political climate these people were increasingly regarded as literally 'out of place'.
As these developments were unfolding in the Soviet Union, similar processes took place in Yugoslavia, another communist federation that exhibited many of the same features as the USSR: also in Yugoslavia, ethnicity was the defining feature of the federation, in fact, Vojvodina. The Serb population in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo soon got caught up in a frenzy of ethnic violence: in wars that erupted in these republics in the 1990s somewhere between 100,000 and 200,000 people were killed. In these wars the status and situation of the local Serbs was one of the major bones of contention.
The Yugoslav carnage sent shockwaves throughout the world and the parallels between the internal Serbian diaspora in Yugoslavia and the internal Russian diaspora in USSR were not lost on political pundits. Alarmists feared that a blow-up of the Soviet Union could lead to a Yugoslavia scenario writ large. The famous American historian Paul Kennedy (Kennedy 1989, p 664) who published his celebrated book The rise and fall of great powers in 1989, wrote worriedly that 'there is nothing in the character or tradition of the Russian state to suggest that it could ever accept imperial decline peacefully'. Another sinister parallel was the dissolution of the French colonial empire: France had certainly not accepted imperial decline peacefully, and the most protracted carnage took place precisely in the colony which contained the highest number of French settlers, Algeria.
As it happened, however, the breakup of the Soviet Union entailed remarkably little violence. It was as an 'implosion' rather than an explosion. To be sure, there was bloodshed and even full-sized civil wars in some republics, with Tajikistan and Azerbaijan/Armenia as Yeltsin for his part sought alliances with the other republican leaders in the USSR. The behavior of the Russian leader was perfectly rational under the circumstances: Yeltsin's main political foe was Gorbachev, the president of the Soviet Union, and in the power struggle between these two men it was a smart move of Yeltsin to align himself with non-Russian leaders who had an interest in eliminating Gorbachev's power base, the USSR. In Yugoslavia, on the other hand, there was no counterpart to Gorbachev whom Milosevic had to struggle against, and all the destructive energies of the Serbian president were spent on confrontations with the non-Serbs.
But what about the position of the internal diaspora of the dominant ethnic group in the two countries, the Serbs outside Serbia and the Russians outside Russia? There clearly were important structural parallels between the two cases. With a few exceptions, however, the Russian diasporians did not mobilize but remained rather passive. Indicatively, the most violent conflicts during the dissolution of the Soviet Union took place precisely in those republics where very few Russians were living, such as Tajikistan and Armenia/Azerbaijan, and the local Russians were not involved.
To be sure, some local activists among the Russians in the non-Russian republics did organize peacefully, by starting Russian centers, so-called obshchiny or communities, and so on. When I and other researchers who were interested in the plight of the Russian diasporians at the time travelled to the various republics, we naturally visited these centers, talked to their leaders, read their newsletters, and so on. Sometimes these centers gave the impression of being quite vibrant and active, with articulate and energetic leaders. Very often, however, this impression was misleading. In a population of some hundred thousand Russians, or even millions, a handful of activists were not able to make much of an impact. As it turned out, these centers in many cases consisted of many chiefs and few Indians. The vast majority of the local Russians often had not heard of their self-appointed spokespersons, and if they had, they remained indifferent to their activities.
During perestroika Soviet loyalists in some republics organized so-called 'interfronts' to fight for the preservation of the Soviet unitary state. This was a countermove to the establishment of so-called 'popular fronts' that fought first for the cultural rights of the titular nation and gradually also for political sovereignty for the republics. While some local
Russians sympathized with the popular fronts and a few titulars supported the interfronts, it is fair to say that the standoff between these two types of movements pitted Russophones and titulars against each other. This was a battle which the Russophones lost resoundingly. Their rallies were pitifully small compared to the massive gatherings which the popular fronts could muster. A remarkable feature of interfronts rallies was also the high average age among the participants (Kolstø, 1995, 113) , It seems almost as if the only Soviet loyalists in the republics who were willing to take to the streets to protest against the wave of titular nationalism, were the pensioners.
This Russian tranquility is quite remarkable since there were many good reasons why we should anticipate mobilization, and I will point to some of them. The first is the resource factor. Many students of political mobilization point to the availability of resources as a critical factor behind collective action. (for instance (Tarrow 1994) In general terms the (Kaiser 1994 ) chapter 5). The percentage among them who worked in prestigious and influential positions was clearly higher than among Russians in the RSFSR, which suggests that geographical and social mobility often go together. This is a phenomenon often observed also among other diaspora groups as well. (Cohen 1997; Chua 2003) One important resource which Michelle Commercio has recently drawn attention to, is access to informal networks (Commercio 2010). This factor, however, was unevenly distributed among the various Russian diaspora communities and this, Commercio believes, may explain why Russians in some republics mobilized politically during and after perestroika to a higher degree than in other republics. In casu, she compares Latvia and
Kyrgyzstan and finds that Russians in the former republic had denser and more powerful networks to draw on than in the latter. Access to powering Central Asia was gained through Furthermore, the grievances which the Russian diasporians experienced would lead us to expect mobilization in defense of their rights. Many theories of ethnic conflict take as they starting point that people rebel when they are aggrieved (for instance Gurr 1993, pp. 61-88) . Even if there were important differences among the various republics it is fair to say that the Russians most places have had ample ground to feel discriminated against. In Estonia and Latvia they were denied the right to obtain original citizenship such as the titular population was granted. They had to apply for citizenship on a par with recent immigrants, and fulfill relatively stringent criteria as regards residence, proficiency in the state language, etc.
Moreover, also in some states where the Russians do enjoy full voting rights they are not automatically guaranteed political representation in proportion to their share of the total population. After independence the titular nationality has to an increasing degree In their book Ethnic Conflict in World Politics Ted Gurr and Barbara Harff point to group discrimination as one major trigger behind ethnic mobilization. In their view, however, discrimination is not a sufficient factor; it has to be combined with group cohesion in order to unleash collective action. Discrimination leads to resentment and anger, but not necessarily to mobilization, they assert. If the group that is discriminated against shares a high degree of common ethnic identity, the likelihood increases that their reaction will take the form of a collective action. Conversely, if group cohesion is lacking, the likelihood that mobilization will take place is considerably reduced. (Gurr and Harff) This leads us to the crucial question of identity. There are good reasons to believe that this variable may be an important factor that may explain the low degree of collective action among Russians in the non-Russian republics.
Identity as a mobilizational factor
Russians in the Soviet Union, and in the tsarist empire before that, seem to have had a rather weak sense of ethnic identity. This is not to say that they were devoid of any collective identity altogether. Russian nationalism no doubt was a phenomenon in the past, and continues to exist today. Historically, however, this nationalism did not focus primarily on ethnicity or culture. To be sure, ethnocultural Russian nationalism did exist -Alexander Solzhenitsyn may be regarded as an important spokesperson of this tendency -but it was not dominant. Much more common was state-oriented nationalism. A typical attitude among
Russian nationalists was pride in the huge state which had been established on the vast
Eurasian continent and of which they were citizens. The fact that this was a multiethnic state did not bother them much, rather, it was seen as quite natural (Szporluk 1989; Hosking 1997) . This has several important consequences. It meant that during the perestroika it was possible to mobilize Russians in support of the threatened unitary Soviet state, in the interfronts, even if these moments were far more modest and torpid than the comparable movements in support of centripetal non-Russian nationalism. The flip side of this strong focus on state and territory in collective Russian identity is that Russian ethnic consciousness was generally weak. As pointed out above, ethnicity, or 'nationality' was institutionalized in the Soviet Union not only in the federal structure of the state, but also on the individual level through the internal passport system. Also ethnic Russians had their natsionalnost' written into their ID documents in this way, but this, it seems, did not bring about the same strong ethnic attachment as in most other groups. In order to explain why this was so, Rogers
Brubaker draws a parallel to the USA. Also in the USA ethnicity is an important identity marker, but not equally strong for all groups. 'Whiteness' is in a sense the quality of being unmarked, of not being 'ethnic' at all. The same was the case with Russianness in the USSR.
'Russianness was a zero-value, an unthematized background condition, ' Brubaker argues (Brubaker 1996 , .p. 49) There are good reasons to treat 'Russianness' in the Soviet Union as a category rather than as a group, if we by the term 'group' imply cohesion, solidarity, and a sense of common identity.
Brubaker does, however, believe that Russians who lived in the republics were more conscious of their nationality than Russians in the RSFSR. This came about as a reaction to the increased assertiveness on the part of the titular nationalities (Brubaker, 1996, p. 49) . But even if many Russians in the republics did have a keen feeling of being different from the local population this does not mean that they necessarily identified with the entire Russian group as a collectivity . As I travelled around in the non-Russian republics in the 1990s, I
often had the chance to discuss identity questions with Russian activists and community leaders in the non-Russian republics. When I asked if they believed that local Russians were
The 2 nd International Conference of the HK RussiaEurasia Research Project, Hanyang Univ., Korea in any way different from Russian in the Russian Federation, I was struck both by the uniformity and the insistence of their affirmative answers. Almost without exception they would insist that 'of course' they were different, it could be no question about it. Their answers also revealed that they had a very positive self-perception when they compared themselves to Russians in the core group. The qualities which they ascribed to Russians in their own republic were generally better than what they associated with Russians in general:
They believed that they had higher personal standards, were more conscientious and hardworking, less given to drinking, and had more stable marriages. (Kolstø 1999; Kolstø 2002 ) When asked to explain why this was the case, they often pointed to the wholesome influence of the local, indigenous people among whom they were living. Thus, for instance, Russians in Estonia would claim that they were highly disciplined and hardworking because they had been imbued with the Estonians' Protestant work ethic. At the same time, Russians in Estonia did not claim to be particularly faithful spouses, having instead the same high divorce rates as Estonians. In Central Asia, by contrast, the local Russians were more proud of their marital fidelity and less proud of their conscientiousness at work: allegedly, the traditional values of the local Muslim communities had rubbed off on them.
We are of course talking here about stereotypes, but as the so-called Thomas theorem goes, 'If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences'. And the skeptical attitudes of the diaspora Russians towards Russians in the core group were to a large extent reciprocated by Russians in Russia. Russians from the republics who moved back to Russia frequently reported that they received a less than cordial welcome. As one leader of a local 'Slavic Diaspora' organization in southern Kyrgyzstan complained in 1993: 'More often than not those who think that they have arrived in their historical homeland, find that they are regarded as aliens' (Uleev 1993, p. 3). We should, however, avoid any dichotomizing description of the Russian group as consisting of two parts --a core and a periphery --as if each of these two parts have a high degree of cohesion internally. That does not seem to be the case. In my discussions with
Russian activists in the non-Russian republics I have been struck by their lack of knowledge about, and even interest in, the plight of their co-ethnics in the other republics. Their frame of reference is the country in which they are living. This is true both of those who make an effort to adapt and of activists who complain bitterly about discrimination and feel thoroughly alienated from the political regime in their country. Life in the neighboring countries seems to be quite literally foreign to them. As one leading Russian expert on the Russian diaspora, Igor Zevelev, remarks, 'a characteristic trait of the Russian diasporas is their fragmentation and weak mobilization. There are no noticeable horizontal links between them. They are distinguishable by size, life style, and level of integration into the local society. They do not have a common enemy or common dreams for the future.' (Zevelev 2008, p. 6 ).
An important line of division within the Russian diaspora communities runs between old-timers and recent arrivals. While some Russians have been born in the republics, as had in some cases even their parents, others came as adults, in order to study, serve there in the military or -most commonly -in search of work. The latecomers became in many ways less integrated in the local culture and society. One clear sign of this was their lack of familiarity with the local language. Few Russians knew the titular language well, but those who had lived there all or most of their life could often make themselves understood in the shops or on the bazaars. This was far less common among the recent immigrants. Those Russians who did not learn the local language were not consigned to a Russian-language ghetto, since they could always expect to be understood when they used Russian. Even so, they cut themselves off from the local culture in a way that more adaptable Russians did not. In an article in Ethnic and Racial studies in 1996 I developed a typology of possible identity trajectories of the Russians in the former soviet republics (see table 2 ). It could be interesting to revisit this article today and see if we now can give any more specific answers. As you will see, in this matrix I operated with four possible political loyalties along the vertical axis and three cultural identities or self-understandings on the horizontal axis.
Some boxes were empty since they represent highly unlikely or even self-contradictory outcomes. Thus, for instance, if a person assimilates culturally into the nationalizing state of reference, he or she is not likely to hang on to a political loyalty to the external homeland, Russia.
1. Continued attachment to the former Soviet Union certainly was strong among many Russians in the first years after the dissolution of the unitary state, among diasporians as well as among people in Russia. This attitude revealed itself for instance in the resolution in the Duma in March 1996 which denounced the dissolution of the Soviet Union with 250 votes against 98 (Kolstø 2000, p. 204) . This attachment, however, is bound to be weakened.
Over the last 20 years a whole new generation had grown up who has no personal memories of this state. Most people realize that restitution of this state is a completely lost case. In 1998 Natalia Kosmarskaia found that 25-30% of Russians in Kyrgyzstan still identified with 'the Soviet people' as the community of people they belonged to (Kosmarskaia 2006 virtually all over the former Soviet space. These newspapers are edited in Moscow, but printed locally. As was the case before the breakup of the USSR they also have some locally edited pages focusing on local matters in the republics in which they are sold. In any case, they function as an important source of information about the 'external homeland'.
Even more important than the print media is television. For most people in most countries TV is their main source of information and entertainment, and the former Soviet Union is no exception in this regard. It is probably true that most Russians in the new states today are just as up-dated on Russian politics as on politics in their state of residence, if not more. By watching Russian soap operas, reality TV, and talk shows they also become in a sense part of a Russian virtual universe. As Michael Billig (Billig 1995) has strongly emphasized, our ideas about who we are, are strongly influenced by the lexicon and images used in the media. When the anchor man in the evening news says 'here' or 'we have', the viewers do not have to be told where 'here' is, or who 'we' are: it is 'in our country' and 'our nation'. In that way, Russian TV viewers in the new states are in a sense subconsciously sucked into a Russia-centered universe. However, there are clear limits to this mechanism of identification. When the meteorologist on Russian TV stands in front of a map of Russia and announces that 'we' will have nice weather tomorrow, the Russians in Moldova or Kazakhstan know that the city they live in, is not on that map. They are not included in the large 'we' which the meteorologist invites the viewers to participate in. Potentially, therefore, the psychological processes Billig have identified may lead to an alienation process in a diaspora situation. This is just a hypothesis which hopefully someone one day will try to test out empirically.
An important factor which weakens the Russia option for the Russians in the nationalizing non-Russian states is the diaspora policy pursued by the Russian state. This claim may seem surprising since the general view is that Russia has been rather aggressive in According to Igor Zevelev, this is because 'Moscow has always regarded the rights and interests of the Russian and other Russian-speaking minorities not as a goal in itself, but a means to achieve a leadership role in the territory of the former Soviet Union' (Zevelev 2008) .
Whenever protection of the diaspora has conflicted with other, more important objectives, the diaspora has been sacrificed on the altar of realpolitik. and now, 14 year later, I stick to my gun. Before I move on to a discussion about which of the three cultural self identifications this political option is most likely to be combined with I will give my reasons why I believe the trend is moving toward increasing political localization.
1. My first argument is related to the sudden near collapse of traffic communications among the former Soviet republics after perestroika. In the Soviet Union, long distance travel was remarkably cheap. The limiting factor was not so much prices as access to attractive tickets, which you could get through your work place, personal contacts (blat), or in other ways. In any case, most people who wanted to visit or friends or relatives in another republic, could find ways to do so. And very many did have relatives in other republics. It was not uncommon to have been born in Kazakhstan, where the parents were still living, having moved to Estonia in search of a job, while grandparents, siblings, or uncles lived in Tajikistan, Ukraine, or Moldova. As long as the Soviet Union existed these were all places which one could be able to visit perhaps once every two or three years, but under perestroika they became all of a sudden off limits. In some cases visa acquisition and bureaucratic red tape was the problem, but more importantly, people no longer could afford these long distance flights. The prices of air tickets soared uncontrollably while salaries remained the same, and
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Another important factor behind the localization of the Russian diaspora communities is outmigration. Those Russians in the former Soviet republics who did travel to Russia, now often bought a one-way ticket only. The outmigration of Russians from the republics has not been as large as some observers expected (for instance Dunlop 1994) , but was nevertheless quite significant, with total figures in the range of 3 to 4 million people.
Importantly, the outflow has been uneven, very high from some republics and low from (The figures I have are only from 1990-2000 but that was the period when the largest migrations took place. As you will see from the tables, they taper off in the late 1990s.)
What I am most interested in today is not migration as such but how the outmigration has affected the situation of those who stayed behind. Two trends seem to be important here.
The first is that those who arrived last tend also to be the ones who left first. They had not struck 'roots' in the local environment, and often had stronger networks of friends, family, and job connections to draw on 'back home' And for them, the expression 'back home' did in fact make sense. A result of this is that those who remained were usually those who were already best integrated in the new states and willing to accept the new cultural and political realities.
Secondly, the returnees, as a rule, were those who were able to find a job elsewhere.
This was much easier for qualified people with a high level of education than for manual laborers. As a result, the social structure of the Russian diaspora population was changed, from being top-heavy, with a significant intelligentsia, to become more proletarian. Up to a point this trend runs at cross purposes with the one I discussed above mentioned since the blue collar workers among the Russians were often less able, or willing, to study the local language and learn about the local culture than were Russians with higher education. Generally speaking, a number of circumstances force the Russian diasporians to learn the local language and acquire a basic knowledge of the country and society they live in. As their numbers shrink, they are no longer able to keep up self-contained communities outside the titular environment to the same degree as before. In several countries they will also be barred from many jobs unless they show a willingness to integrate. The younger generations who have spent most of their life --or all of it --in this country, will lead the way and perhaps pull their parents with them.
In 1996-8 I led a research team that studied ethnic integration in two post-Soviet states, Latvia and Kazakhstan. In that connection we conducted large-scale opinion surveys in these two countries, in which we asked inter alia, 'Which country do you regard as your situation changed radically. The sociopolitical cataclysms that followed in its wake --radical changes in the economic situation, the mass migration, and so on --became a potent stimulus for the Russian-speakers towards a deeper and more conscious perception of their separateness.' (Kosmarskaia 2006, p. 405) , emphasis in the original.
In our The Latvians tended to see fewer differences between Russians in Russia and in Latvia. They were less willing to give local Russians credit for higher diligence, hospitality, individualism, or culture compared to Russians in Russia, and they definitely did not think that 'their' Russians were more cultured, tolerant, and sober or less conflictual than other Russians. On these quality traits, they gave the Russians as low score as 2.69 to 3.06, a real slap in the face. Only on the issue of drinking habits did the Russians themselves tend to agree with these negative assessments. As regards culture, tolerance, and ability to avoid conflict they gave themselves 0.7 to 1.0 higher scores than did the Latvians! Thus, we can draw the conclusion that in both countries the local Russians saw themselves as both different from, and better than, Russians in Russia, but only in Kazakhstan did this self-image correspond to any significant degree with the image of them which the titular population held.
One important factor that has contributed to a process of dissociation of the Russians in the republics from the Russian core group is the gradual amalgamation of the various non- and 'Asians' is seen as strong, also ethnic Germans, and in fact also Volga Tatars are habitually included into this Russian-speaking category (Kolstø 1999, pp. 29-40) . At the same time, this ethnocultural amalgamation has not been a simple one-way process in which the non-Russian Russian-speakers have been simply swamped by their Russian neighbors. In the majority of the post-Soviet states the last ten years of sovereign development have somewhat hastened the process of turning the Russian populations in the countries of the new abroad into new Russian diasporas. During this period they have become convinced that they no longer have behind them the formerly mighty metropolitan state, nor will they have it in the future. The Russian population is firmly set on remaining in their respective countries of residence, and have begun to develop the habits and attitudes of a 'diasporian' orientation (Savoskul, 2001, p. 19 ).
Before we can finish our analysis, we must also consider the last and final of the identity options of the Russian diasporians, which is assimilation. Many Russians who moved his often very sophisticated arguments but jump right to the conclusion: in Kazakhstan he thinks the answer is no -the socio-cultural distance between the Russian-speakers and the titulars is too large. The Russian who do not emigrate will continue to live as small isolated communities. In Latvia and Estonia the answer is yes -the Baltic cultures are so prestigious and the Baltic standard of living is so high that they will exert an irresistible pull on the Russians. Finally, in Ukraine Laitin predicts consociationalism, or the continued coexistence of two high cultures (Laitin 1998, pp.353-61) .
I think it is still too early to pass a verdict on Laitin's scenarios. If he is right, it means that the adaptation processes among the Russians who suddenly and unexpectedly ended up as national minorities in nationalizing non-Russians states are going even faster than most observers would predict. But even if he is wrong, we can safely conclude that even in the unlikely situation that an irredentist party should come to power in Moscow with a programme for the restitution of the collapsed state (in one form or another) there will be scant support for such policies among those who are often regarded as the main victims of this state collapse, the beached Russian communities in the Soviet successor states.
